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Abstract— The trend toward autonomous robot deployments 
is on an upward growth curve. These robots are undertaking new 
tasks and are being integrated into society. Examples of this trend 
are autonomous vehicles, humanoids, and eldercare. The 
movement from factory floors to streets and homes has also 
increased the number of vulnerabilities that adversaries can 
utilize. To improve security, Robot Operating System (ROS) 2 has 
standardized on using Data Distributed Services (DDS) as the 
messaging layer, which supports a security standard for 
protecting messages between parties with access control 
enforcement. DDS security is dependent on the OpenSSL and a 
security configuration file that specifies sensitive data location. 
DSS Security assumes that the underlining Operating System (OS) 
is secure and that the dependencies are consistent, but ongoing 
integrity checks are not performed. This paper looks at two 
vulnerabilities that we exploit using an OpenSSL spy process and 
a security property file manipulation.  An overview of each exploit 
is provided with an evaluation of mitigation technologies that may 
be employed in client computers, servers, and other areas. Since, 
ROS 2 and DDS run in user space, these processes are prone to 
vulnerabilities. We provide recommendations about mitigation 
technology, as currently autonomous platforms are being 
deployed without safe-guards for on or off-line threats. The Trust 
Platform Module (TPM) is new to robotic systems, but the 
standard usage model does not provide risk mitigation above the 
OS layer for the types of attacks we discuss.  
Keywords—ROS2, DDS Security, Vulnerabilities, Spy process, 
OpenSSL, Trusted Computing Group, Trusted Platform Module, 
Attestation 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Modern robots are constructed with sensors, controllers, 
communications, motors, hardware accelerators as well as 
software forming a cognitive layer for processing and 
controlling the robot. Autonomous robots are often fully 
autonomous, putting their software and hardware all in one 
location, providing an adversary with a complete system with 
little, if any, physical security.  
This makes physical attacks on robots much easier than 
attacks on corporate managed computers, since systems are 
typically under system management and are physically 
protected by the building that houses them. As robots move 
from factory floors into society this physical protection is 
removed making systems more vulnerable.  
 
To address security in robotic systems, ROS 2 with DDS 
Security allows online data in-motion encryption with access 
control protection. DDS security is dependent on the 
OpenSSL and a security configuration file that specifies 
sensitive data location. DSS Security assumes that the 
underlining Operating System (OS) is secure and that the 
dependencies are consistent, but ongoing integrity checks are 
not performed.  However, off-line and on-line exploits can 
involve software or hardware attacks, especially when robots 
are out in the wild. Research is in the early stages of 
investigating autonomous vehicle security [1] [2], artificial 
intelligence and robotics [3] while others are looking at the 
performance related to security [4] and creating isolation 
containers from memory restrictions using ARM Trustzone 
[5]. However, these approaches tend to focus on individual 
security threats and ignore viewing the threat environment as a 
whole; that is, taking what we refer to as a holistic approach to 
autonomous robot security.  An example vulnerability analysis 
can be found in [3]. 
 
Operating systems are generally known for being susceptible 
to various types of exploits; a common one being the 
exploitation of privilege escalation [6] [7] [8] to gain access. 
The use of secure and trusted boot code mitigates some of 
these potential threats, but only up to the OS layer.  In Linux, 
the OpenSSL library executes in the user space, so the 
application space is vulnerable to many exploits. These 
exploits include buffer overflow, timing attacks, and injected 
malware, just to name a few. 
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This paper identifies exploits in the user/ application space 
related to OpenSSL and the property configuration file for the 
ROS 2/DDS security usage model.  Serval technologies are 
examined that potentially mitigate these vulnerabilities. 
 
We describe four different scenarios where these types of 
attacks affect the behavior of the system.  
 
• In use case one, we have a swarm of drones that are 
performing a surveillance mission around a building. 
Each night at the same time the drones are dispatched. 
We will call this the spy intercept scenario. The drones 
have been infected by the adversary’s altered OpenSSL 
library and now the data is being streamed to a remote 
server where all the data is being dumped.  The 
adversary now has the capability to review the mission, 
data captured from the drones and can determine where 
potential schedule gaps of surveillance exists.  
• In use case two, an adversary has placed an altered 
OpenSSL library on the platform and is able to siphon 
data from a sensor. In this example, a camera mounted 
on the robot can send data to a remote server for the 
adversary to view, this is called stealing services. 
• In use case three, an autonomous vehicle can be 
repurposed.  An adversary has altered the OpenSSL 
library on a vehicle and now has access to the keys. This 
means that control of the vehicle can be achieved for late 
night runs when owner is asleep. The car can be returned 
without being noticed. 
• In use case four, the configuration file is altered by the 
adversary to change the credentials in the property file, 
this will enable the adversary to take control of the robot 
platform without being noticed. The property 
configuration file and OpenSSL library manipulation 
can occur on the same platform to provide additional 
control to the adversary. 
 
The above use cases are a set of examples of OpenSSL or 
property file exploits. The list of exploits can grow and will 
enable an adversary to have control of an autonomous 
platform. 
 
II. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
A. Exploiting the usage of OpenSSL  
In this paper, we show that a compromised OpenSSL library 
can intercept sensitive information while victim participants 
believe they are sending secure publisher and subscriber 
messages. In ROS2/DDS, security on a Linux system is 
enabled by having an interface between the vendor’s security 
plugins and the OpenSSL library. The governance and 
participant policies define the security behavior within the 
domain. These behaviors also define the protection kinds to be 
used and therefore, the cryptographic algorithms associated 
with any communications. The vendor’s security plugin 
implementation is proprietary, and how or what functions are 
being called from within the OpenSSL library is also 
unknown. However, by replacing the original OpenSSL 
library with an altered “spy” OpenSSL library, the interactions 
between participants become visible. Using this approach, we 
demonstrate that information can be captured on a victim 
machine. While the demonstration presented here was done 
locally, a remote server can be utilized where all information 
is sent to it for post processing or data manipulation, as in a 
man in middle attack. As autonomous robots tend to have 
many, if not all, of their nodes on a single platform this type of 
exploit can be a severe threat. To thwart this type of attack, we 
identify mitigation techniques that may be applied for 
detecting unknown spy processes in the Linux user space 
software stack. 
B.  Manipulating the configuration file for misuse 
Another exploit we explore is the misuse of the ROS 2/DDS 
Security property file where security credentials are 
configured. This attack involves an adversary manipulate the 
property data using masquerading credentials. A single, 
unprotected, configuration file supports the credentials of the 
CA’s Certificate (authentication and document sign); 
participant’s certificate and private key; as well as the signed 
governance and participant’s policies. These configuration 
files point to locations on the file system where the sensitive 
data is located, and changes to these files are undetected; 
meaning that an adversary can substitute their own credentials. 
Depending on the CA’s issuing policy, an email can be the 
simplest form of authentication for issuance, so an adversary 
can get their own credentials from the initial CA versus just 
replacing the configuration file with adversary data. The 
private keys are base 64 encoded using a privacy enhanced 
mail (PEM) format [9], depending on the security policy these 
can be password protected. However, there is no difference 
between how the security plugin checks for an illegal set of 
configuration parameters versus a legitimate set; therefore, an 
adversary can change the credential parameters without 
detection. 
 
III. BACKGROUND 
 
The Robot Operating System (ROS) 2 uses the Data 
Distribution Service (DDS) [10] as the transport layer. An 
extension to DDS is the DDS security standard, which provides 
the data protection layer on the Real Time Publisher Subscriber 
(RTPS) [11] data. DDS security [12] is implemented by a 
vendor’s security plugin. The standard specifies five Security 
Plugin Interfaces (SPIs); Authentication, Access Control, 
Cryptographic, Logging and Data Tagging. 
Authentication and Cryptographic operations are defined in 
the standard, but the implementation is dependent on the 
vendor. There are no test vectors or compliance tests for the 
security plugin implementation. The standard simply defines 
specific algorithms for authentication and cryptographic 
operations - OpenSSL [13] is a common cryptographic library 
for providing these algorithms.  
  
 
When ROS2 is built on top of a DDS implementation it must 
have all its dependent paths configured. The build process 
must include a path to OpenSSL or another, cryptographic 
library. In the case of using RTI 5.3 DDS with support for 
DDS security on Linux, the security plugin is configured to 
use OpenSSL native.   
 
An XML or YAML (YAML Ain't Markup Language) 
structured file is used to define the parameters for the security 
plugin. These parameters are the Certificate Authorities public 
keys, for identity and policies, signed governance and 
permission policy files, and the participant’s certificate and 
private key. The file path for each of the parameters is also set 
in the property configuration file. Each of the policies 
(governance and permission) enables a protection kind on the 
message data. Available protection kinds are discovery, 
liveliness, RTPS, metadata and data. An explanation of these 
protection kinds can be found in [3] [12]. The policies also 
define the access control for the domain; that includes the 
nodes, and who has write or read authorization. 
 
To use a DDS implementation with ROS 2, the environment is 
setup by configuring the paths for the DDS implementation; on 
Linux this is done in the users bashrc file. The DDS 
configuration includes the path to the OpenSSL library. Next, 
the DDS environment and ROS 2 are compiled with the DDS. 
Since, the OpenSSL library can be updated by upstream 
providers for Linux, this library lives in user space. In most cases 
the OpenSSL library is used as a dynamic shared library, so that 
changes to the OpenSSL library are independent of the 
application. In the case where the OpenSSL library is a static 
shared library both DDS and ROS 2 must be recompiled to take 
advantage of any new patches or updates. 
 How each participant discovers, and shares information is 
enforced by the Governance and the Participant security 
policies. The transfer of data between two participants in the 
global data space is performed using the Real Time Publish 
Subscribe protocol (RTPS) [11]. The use of QoS profiles 
allows the RTPS communication layer to provide reliability 
and support for realtime environments where critical processes 
are under time constraints to complete. QoS profiles or 
property files also enable the security parameters for the DDS 
Security deployment model. When security controls are turned 
on, discovery (who is publishing, sequence numbering and in-
line QoS), reliability (heartbeat, ack, nack) metadata and 
payload data can be encrypted providing the highest security 
protections. The usage of the protection kinds corresponds to 
what types of cryptographic algorithms are called. In order to 
exchange data between participants in a secure manner, each 
participant is initially issued an identity certificate using a 
public key algorithm. The authentication plugin performs the 
initial setup for key exchange and that is followed by security 
controls performed by the cryptographic plugin. The following 
set of cryptographic equations are given as reference (DDS 
Security standard) and are discussed in the attack overview 
section. 
 
For the authentication plugin, a participant is issued a certificate 
based on one of the following types of algorithm/key definitions, 
RSASSA-PSS 2048 or ECDSA 256 bits.  
RSASSA-PSS is defined as [14]: 
𝑛 = 𝑝 ∗ 𝑞    (1) 
Where n = is the modulus, p and q = are prime numbers, and d 
= is the private exponent. The modulus, n, specifies the key 
length in bits. The message m, is encrypted using the private key 
to produce a digital signature, s. 
𝑅𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆 − 𝑆𝐼𝐺𝑁 = ((𝑛, 𝑑), 𝑚) (1a) 
To verify the digital signature, the public key, e = is the public 
exponent is used to decrypt the message. 
 
𝑅𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐴 − 𝑃𝑆𝑆 − 𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐼𝐹𝑌 = ((𝑛, 𝑒), 𝑚, 𝑠) (1b) 
 
ECDSA is defined as [15]: 
 
𝑄𝑎(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑑 ∗  𝐺   (2) 
 
where d = private key, G = field of points, and Q (x, y) = public 
key curve point 
 
Sign operation: 
𝑟 = 𝑥 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛     (2a) 
 where r is part of the signature pair, n = integer order of G 
𝑠 = 𝑘−1(𝑧 − 𝑟𝑑)    (2b) 
where k= random integer, z = left most bit of the hash 
Verify operation 
𝑤 = 𝑠−1𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛    (2c) 
𝑢1 = 𝑧 ⋅ 𝑤 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 and 𝑢2 = 𝑟 ⋅ 𝑤 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑛 (2d) 
(𝑥, 𝑦) = 𝑢1 × 𝐺 + 𝑢2𝑥 𝑄𝑎   (2e) 
where r = x mod n 
Key Agreement is used to exchange symmetric keys using 
public keys. The DH key is 2048-bits MODP Group with 256-
bits Prime or ECDH + prime 256 v1 as stated in the standard 
[12].  These are considered ephemeral keys, that are 
temporary and only for the session. 
 
ECDH is defined as [16]: 
(𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘) = 𝑑𝑎𝑄𝑏   (3) 
where 𝑄𝑏 = public key of user2 
 
(𝑥𝑘 , 𝑦𝑘) = 𝑑𝑏𝑄𝑎   (3a) 
where 𝑄𝑎 = public key of user1
 
  
𝑥𝑘= shared secret between user1 and user2 is used to 
exchange symmetric keys. 
For the cryptographic plugin, AES_GCM and AES_GMAC 
are used for authenticated encryption and decryption 
  
functions, that are symmetric key operations. Symmetric key 
operations are low latency, especially when cryptographic 
modes are combined into an atomic operation. AES_GCM is 
mostly discussed in the papers, but GMAC is a mode of GCM 
in which no plain text is supplied and the output is the 
authenticated field.  GCM -128 and GCM -256-bit keys are 
specified in the standard. 
 
Authenticated Encryption is defined as [17]: 
 
 𝐶 = 𝑃 ⊕ 𝑀𝑆𝐵(𝐸(𝐾, 𝑌))   (4) 
 
where C = ciphertext, P = plaintext, MSB = Most 
Significant Bit, E = encryption of Y using K = key 
 
𝑇 = 𝑀𝑆𝐵(𝐺𝐻𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝐻, 𝐴, 𝐶)  ⊕  𝐸(𝐾, 𝑌))  (4a) 
 
where T = tag, H = hash, A = additional 
authenticated data, C= ciphertext, IV = nonce 
 
Authenticated Decryption is defined as [17]: 
 
  𝑇 = 𝑀𝑆𝐵(𝐺𝐻𝐴𝑆𝐻(𝐻, 𝐴, 𝐶)  ⊕  𝐸(𝐾, 𝑌)) (4b) 
  𝑃 = 𝐶 ⊕ 𝑀𝑆𝐵(𝐸(𝐾, 𝑌))   (4c) 
 
A hash function is called the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA -
2). Hash functions are used to protect the integrity of the data 
from being altered. Using a Hash Message Authentication Key 
Code HMAC 11 falls under this category also, except that it 
uses a key as part of the hash algorithm. 
 
 SHA-2 is defined as [18]: 
  SHA-2 = (M)  (5) 
 HMAC is defined as [19]: 
 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶 = (𝐾, 𝑀)    (6) 
 
The OpenSSL library has two functions, one is for the 
cryptographic algorithm operations and certificate support, the 
second is for client and server support for the secure socket 
layer / transport secure layer. The OpenSSL command line 
executable is in the /usr/bin directory on Ubuntu Linux. 
The directory /usr/lib/ssl points to 
/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf, which defines how certificates are 
created. Under the ssl directory are the certs, misc, and private 
directories. The certs directory has several certificates, the 
misc directory handles the certificate generation and private is 
owned by root as the key store. The header files are in the 
/usr/include/openssl directory and the shared, libssl 
and libcryto libraries are in the /lib/x86_64-linux_gnu 
directory. The OpenSSL software layers are illustrated in 
Figure 1, starting with a set of abstracted higher level APIs, 
followed by the lower level APIs and supporting utilities and 
the hardware interface being at the lowest  [20]. 
 
 
Figure 1: OpenSSL Architecture 
 
The RTPS protocol standard defines the message structure for 
data exchange and the DDS security standard defines the new 
RTPS message wrappers that conform to the RTPS 
messages[12]. The wrappers provide the protection on the 
message structure using encryption, message authentication 
and/or digital signatures. 
 
When security is enabled the RTPS messages are transformed 
with special wrappers and still conform to the protocol 
standard. Figure 2 [12] shows a regular message stack on the 
left and the secure transformation on the right. Depending on 
the protection kind being specified the secure wrappers can be 
applied at the RTPS message, meta sub-message and/or at the 
payload sub-message levels. 
 
The rtps_protection_kind provides protection on the entire 
message including the message header.  Instead of protecting 
the entire message, a finer control can be achieved using the 
metadata_protection _kind and data_protection_kind as two 
independent operations. 
The metadata_protection_kind provides protection on the sub-
message header and the sub-message elements that includes 
the GuidPrefix, EntityId, SequenceNumber, 
SequenceNumberSet, FragmentNumber, ragmentNumberSet, 
VendorId, ProtocolVersion, LocatorList, Timestamp, Count, 
and ParameterList elements. The data_ protection_kind is 
only protecting the serialized payload, so depending on the 
security requirements different levels of protection can be 
achieved using the Governance policy. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the SRTPS_PREFIX is used to wrap a 
complete RTPS message and the sub-messageId is set to 0x33. 
This is followed by SEC_PREFIX, that is used to wrap a RTPS 
sub-message and the sub-messageId is set to 0x31. The 
SecurePayload has a sub-messageId set to the value 0x30. The 
counterparts to the prefixes are the postfix messages that 
provide a method to validate the authenticity of the RTPS sub-
messages. The SEC_POSTFIX has a sub-meesageId of 0x32 
and the SRTPS_POSTIX has the sub-messageId of 0x34. The 
SecureDataHeader contains the cryptographic transformation 
information and is followed by the information that 
authenticates the result from the cryptographic transform. 
  
 
 
Figure 2: Secure Transform of RTPS messages 
The set of defined builtins in the DDS Security standard are 
used to enable the interoperability between vendors. Section 7 
of the DDS security standard defines the mappings of Entity 
Id values for the secure builtin data writer and data reader. 
Mappings for builtin participants,  CryptoTransformationKind 
and CryptoTransformKeyId are defined in section 8, and key 
material is defined in section 9 [12] Table 1 shows the list of 
partial values that are transmitted during the RTPS message 
exchange. 
 
Table 1: Mapping values used in the secure transactions 
Mapping 
Name 
Name Value 
Entity Ids 
Mapping 
SEDPbuiltinPublicationSecureWriter {{ff,00,03}, c2} 
 SEDPbuiltinPublicationSecureReader {{ff,00,03}, c7} 
 SEDPbuiltinSubscriptionSecureWriter {{ff,00,04}, c2} 
 SEDPbuiltinSubscriptionSecureReader {{ff,00,04}, c7} 
 BuiltinParticipantMessageSecureWrite
r 
{{ff.20,00}, c2} 
 BuiltinParticipantMessageSecureReade
r 
{{ff.20,00}, c7} 
 BuiltinParticipantStatelessMessageWri
ter 
{{00.20,01}, c3} 
 BuiltinParticipantStatelessMessageRea
der 
{{00.20,01}, c4} 
 BuiltinParticipantVolatileMessageSecu
reWriter 
{{ff,02,02}, c3} 
 BuiltinParticipantVolatileMessageSecu
reReader 
{{ff,02,02}, c4} 
 SPDPbuiltinParticipantsSecureWriter  
 
{{ff, 01,01}, c2} 
 SPDPbuiltinParticipantsSecureReader  
 
{{ff,01 01}, c7} 
   
Member  PID_IDENTITY_TOKEN 0x1001 
 PID_PERMISSION_TOKEN 0x1002 
 PID_PARTICIPANT_SECURITY_IN
FO  
0x1005 
 PID_PROPERTY_LIST 0x0059 
   
Cryptogra
phic 
CRYPTO_TRANSFORMATION_KI
ND_NONE              
{0, 0, 0, 0} 
 CRYPTO_TRANSFORMATION_KI
ND_AES128_GMAC       
{0, 0, 0, 1}     
 CRYPTO_TRANSFORMATION_KI
ND_AES128_GCM        
{0, 0, 0, 2} 
 CRYPTO_TRANSFORMATION_KI
ND_AES256_GMAC       
{0, 0, 0, 3} 
 CRYPTO_TRANSFORMATION_KI
ND_AES256_GCM        
{0, 0, 0, 4}     
 
IV. ATTACK OVERVIEW 
The five security plugs are provided by the vendor as object 
code that treats, the OpenSSL library as a black box. Thus, to 
understand how the security services use the OpenSSL library, 
we examined the OpenSSL library to see what cryptographic 
functions were being called. The cryptographic functions are 
defined in the security standard, but since OpenSSL has two 
different levels of API as shown in Figure 1, we needed to add 
dump routines to save data that is normally internal to 
OpenSSL library operation into files and use that data to 
identify the use of specific OpenSSL function calls. This 
process is not trivial as for some cryptographic functions there 
are initial, update and final sets of API calls to complete a 
single cryptographic operation. 
 
Our first step was to add these dump routines into the 
cryptographic functions, specifically gcm128, hmac, e_aes, 
evp_digest, and ech_key. Since the property file already has 
the identity key values in the local directory there was no need 
to add additional dump routines in the code. The dump routine 
  
used was the hexdump function found in the OpenSSL library 
test code but modified for writing to a local file. In most cases 
the output from the individual routines were modified to 
match the hexdump function parameters. For example, static 
void hexdump (File *f, const char *title, unsigned char * s, int 
l) was the modified dump routine and for working with big 
numbers the format needed to convert was BN_bn2hex().  The 
basic function call was hexdump (stdout, “title”, variable, 
variable length). This call was placed into each of the above 
files and within each initial, update and final API function. 
Figure 3 shows the flow of cryptographic operations 
performed during authentication between two parties along the 
horizontal path and how data protection is performed is shown 
in the vertical path.   
 
As part of the authentication, a common shared secret is 
established using a key exchange algorithm (equations 3 and 
3a), this value is hashed and used within the 
CryptoKeyFactory, CryptoKeyExchange, CryptoTransform 
and LogOptions data structures for identity and authentication 
token exchange (see tables 36, 37, 38 and 39 of  [12]). As a 
final step, the participant will digitally sign the data using 
his/her private key (all equations in 1 or 2 depending on 
algorithm and equation 5 for the hash operations). As part of 
the dump routines this data is captured to reveal the sensitive 
data, such as shared secret, message token parameters and 
private keys used to digitally sign the token data. 
 
The vertical path is used to perform integrity and 
confidentiality data protection. From the hashed data branch to 
applying an integrity check using HMAC (equation 6), the 
data is than transformed using AES_GCM (all equation in 4).  
The key computation and cryptographic transformations 
formulas (see table 73) in the DDS security standard [12] 
provides key convolutions and transforms. The dump routines 
reveal all the data and keys used during these cryptographic 
operations. The output data from each of the dump routines 
must be converted from hex to ascii to show the human 
readable data being exposed. Even though some of the 
sensitive data is transient, an adversary can still manipulate the 
data and expose a threat as discussed in the use cases above. 
 
To confirm our data dump routines and modified OpenSSL 
Library performed as desired, we tested in two different 
environments. The first test environment was configured using 
a Lenovo W541 computer with Linux Ubuntu 16.04. The 
Figure 3: DDS Security data dump flow 
  
OpenSSL library used was 1.0.2m, but newer releases can also 
be used. The Real-Time Innovation (RTI) 5.3 DDS with 
security and RTI Perftest 2.4 [21] were used to compile and 
run the tests. Wireshark 2.4.6 was used to capture the RTPS 
packet network traffic. The OpenSSL source files were 
downloaded from OpenSSL.org, modified, and compiled. The 
files were extracted in the /usr/src/opensll-1.0.2m directory. 
All the changes were done in the /crypto directory and 
gcm128 was under the /crypto/modes directory. 
 
To verify that the modified OpenSSL libraries were still 
working correctly, outputs were compared to the downloaded 
OpenSSL test vectors. The following commands were used to 
compile and test: 
 
1) /usr/src/openssl-1.0.2m$ ./configure shared (creates 
lib* and openssl files) 
2) /usr/src/openssl-1.0.2m$ sudo make   (compile) 
3) /usr/src/openssl-1.0.2m$ sudo make test   (test) 
 
Each of the dump routines were checked against the test 
vectors, or against the standards being followed by the 
OpenSSL developers. For example, RFC 7027 for the brain 
pool curve test vectors. The matching of the dump routine to 
the test vectors gave confidence that the dump routines and 
formatting were providing the same results from a known 
good source. Now that the OpenSSL library has been 
compiled and tested we compiled against the RTIPerftest. For 
this to occur we first directed the path to our OpenSSL by 
creating a symlink: ln -s /path/to file /path/to/symlink and by 
changing the bashrc file RTI_OPENSSLHOME = 
/usr/src/openssl_1.0.2m. RTIPerftest compiled using: 
./build.sh –platform x64Linux3gcc5.4.0 –secure –openssl-
home /usr/src/openssl-1.0.2m.  
 
Our next step is to collect data using wireshark and saving 
only those transactions that used the RTPS protocol only to, 
reduce the amount of network traffic data collected. We ran 
the publisher and subscriber using no security to give us a 
baseline with the following commands in two console 
terminals: 
 
1) ./bin/x64Linux3gcc5.4.0/release/perftest_cpp -pub -
datalen 63000 -executionTime 1 
2) ./bin/x64Linux3gcc5.4.0/release/perftest_cpp -sub -
datalen 63000 
 
In Figure 4 is the result of no security shown using Wireshark. 
 
 
Figure 4: Wireshark plain run of publisher and subscriber 
transaction 
We use the following commands to run with discovery and 
liveness protection kind using encrytion: 
 
1) ./bin/x64Linux3gcc5.4.0/release/perftest_cpp -pub -
datalen 63000 -secureEncryptDiscovery -
executionTime 1 
2) ./bin/x64Linux3gcc5.4.0/release/perftest_cpp -sub -
datalen 63000 -secureEncryptDiscovery 
 
From our dump routines there should be several files that have 
been created in the specified directory paths, Figure 5 shows 
the output from Wireshark where the top blue highlight is one 
of the secure wrappers as shown in Figure 2. The lower blue 
highlight is the expanded view that represents the encoding of 
Figure 5: Wireshark detailed view into RTPS protocol transaction using secureEncryptDiscovery enabled 
  
the SecurePayload with a value of 0x30 using a 
crypto_transformation with AES-GCM 256 that correlates to 
value {0, 0, 0, 4} as shown in Table 1.   The payload is followed 
by a closing post sub message with a value of x32. 
 
Figure 6 shows the dump routine file that was generated 
showing the gcm key, iv and final tag. These values can be 
used to decrypt the messages if they aren’t already in the clear 
in another file, like the digest output file. 
 
Figure 4: Output from dump routine that shows key, iv and final tag 
Figure 7 shows the output from an AES_GCM 256 bit script 
to decrypt the data using the key, iv and final tag [22]. We 
show that by obtaining the relevant algorithm parameters that 
decryption is validated by the auth_ok_ = true and plain text 
being showed between the brackets in figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 5: Output from gcm decrpt script 
In the ecdh file this is the data captured from the key exchange 
between publisher and subscriber. Figure 8 shows the public; 
private and shared secret key being dumped. 
 
 
Figure 6: ECDH handshake between two participants to reveal the 
shared secret key 
The second test environment was configured using a Lenovo 
L450 with Ubuntu 18.04, RTI DDS with security 5.3.1, ROS 2 
Bouncy Bolson release and SROS enabled. We used the same 
OpenSSL Library as in the first test environment, release 
1.0.2m that was modified. We copied the files into their 
respective locations. The results from our data dump routine 
revealed the plaintext for the Hello World example using 
SROS as shown in Figure 9, running the talker and listener 
nodes. 
 
 
Figure 7: SROS example of talker and listener 
 
From our output dump routines, we can exploit the DDS 
security and view the data being exchanged between two 
parties. An adversary can easily replace the libcrypto.so.* and 
libssl.so.* files in the /lib/x86_64-linux_gnu directory using 
an escalated privilege exploit. The dump routine can be easily 
extended to write the data to a remote server. Validation was 
performed using Ubuntu 16.04 on a ThinkPad® model L450, 
where the files libcrpto.1.0.0 and libssl.1.0.0 were in the 
/lib/x86_64 directory. These files were replaced with our spy 
libraries and symlinks were created to libcrypto.so and 
libssl.so from these two libraries. 
libcrypto.so.1.0.0 -> libcrypto.so 
libssl.so.1.0.0 -> libssl.so 
 
We copied the openssl file into /usr/bin, which provided the 
configuration needed to capture the data being used by RTI 
DDS security plugin. 
 
The basic concept of using DDS security is to have all 
participants use public key and have the policy rules digitally 
signed. This level of trust is established at the Certificate 
Authority since both identity and document certificates are 
issued by a single entity. Depending on the deployment model 
different CAs can issue identity and document signing 
operations. The validation in a two-party exchange is 
performed by having the chain of trust, this means that the 
issuing CAs public key must be available during a public key 
validation operation. When security is enabled each 
participant must have their identity credentials and the signed 
governance and permission files on the same platform. Since, 
autonomous systems are self-contained, credentials and policy 
  
rules are also stored on the platform. A property file defines 
all the participants (publisher and subscriber) credentials, 
identity CA’s public key file, and document signed CA’s 
public key, and signed policy rules (governance and 
permission) located within a directory. An example of a 
property file is shown in Figure 10 where the credential 
locations are defined. The security plugin is defined at the top 
of the file, followed by the CA certificate and PEM data. The 
domain governance file location is defined followed by the 
participants (publisher and subscriber). In each of those 
sections the permission file location is defined and as well as 
the private key locations. This example is for a dynamic 
linking security property file and a static method can be used 
but would need to be compiled into the code. 
 
 
Figure 8: Property file example for a publisher and subscriber 
Since changes in credentials and locations will occur, the 
static method is less flexible since this requires the program to 
be compiled for each change.  In this example the CA’s , 
publisher, subscriber and signed files are known by the 
security plugins, since these files are parsed for the required 
information to perform, authentication, authorization and 
cryptographic operations using the parameters provided.  
 
However, no checks are performed on these files, so that 
manipulation of the parameters or the files themselves can be 
achieved by an adversary.  An adversary can masquerade the 
credentials with their own set or change the policy rule files 
with system parameters / topic names to be self-signed. We 
see this as a serious vulnerability, since a property file can be 
altered, and no checks are in place to detect the tampering or 
credentials being replaced. 
 
V. EVALUATE MITIGATION OPTIONS 
We will evaluate several technologies that might mitigate one 
of the two vulnerabilities and provide a recommendation for 
both. The first technology is the Trusted Platform Module, the 
second being the Security Services for DDS security plugins 
using ARM TrustedZone and the recommendation is the 
combination of Integrity Measurement Architecture 
(IMA)/Extended Verification Module (EVM) with the TPM. 
 
Several industries are using the Trusted Platform Module 
(TPM), part of the Trusted Computer Group (TCG) to 
establish root of trust for the PC/Server market. This is being 
extended into the mobile and Internet of Things as proposed 
by GlobalPlatform [23] and the Industrial Internet of Things 
Security Framework [24].  The introduction of using TPMs in 
robots is still a novel thought. Trusted boot is the process of 
taking measurements during the boot process from firmware 
to Operating System (OS) and validating the measurements 
against a known good set of values by a 3rd party. The TPM is 
a small microprocessor like a smart card but has a different 
structure for how hash values are stored in platform 
configuration registers (PCR).  Figure 9 shows the TPM 2.0 
structure with support for newer algorithms including Elliptic 
Curve cryptography and SHA 256 bit. 
 
 
Figure 9: Trusted Platform Module 2.0 
The TPM functionality can be implemented in software as 
well but eliminates the hardware protection features found in 
some manufactures products. In either case, static or dynamic 
root of trust measurements are up to the OS executing. In the 
case of static case PCR (0 to 7) are used in the boot process 
from Power on Reset (PoR) to OS and in the dynamic case 
  
PCR (17 to 20) when the x86 instruction halts the processor 
into a known state [25].  Table 1 provides the layout structure 
for the TMP as shown below [25] [26].  
 
 
Table 2: Platform Configuration Register Layout 
PCR 
Number 
PCR Value 
0 BIOS 
1 BIOS Configuration 
2 Option ROMs 
3 Option ROM configuration 
4 MBR (master boot record) 
5 MBR configuration 
6 State transitions and wake events 
7 Platform manufacturer specific measurements 
8 to 9  Static operating system 
10 Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) 
11 to 15 Static operating system 
16 Debug 
17 DRTM and launch control policy 
18 Trusted OS start-up code (MLE) 
19 Trusted OS (for example OS configuration) 
20 Trusted OS (for example OS Kernel and other 
code) 
21 as defined by the Trusted OS 
22 as defined by the Trusted OS 
23 Application support 
24  
 
 
The purpose of the trusted boot using a TPM was for network 
admission, meaning that before the computing node was 
granted access to the network it was validated against Policy 
Enforcement Point and Policy Decision Point entities. The 
TMP is used to store the hash values collected during the boot 
process and then digitally sign a quote (all the hash values), 
that was sent within a Tunneled Network Connection protocol. 
The known good values or golden measurements were stored 
and validated by a 3 rd party verifier, and the result of the 
compare was sent to the PDP to remediate or allow the 
compute node to gain access. The remediation process, for 
example is to update the compute node with the latest software 
patches or image. Once updated the compute node would 
validate and gain network access. This remediation process 
only works for systems with network access. Other models are 
using the TPM for secure boot like, bitlocker in windows. In 
TPM 1.2 the chip didn’t offer any physical protection and 
defense was weak. In some vendor implementations the TPM 
2.0 has physical protection at the die level that adds a tamper 
resistant mesh, this helps with hardware side channel attacks. 
The TPM can be used to valid specific application PCR 
values, but this needs to be implemented with custom software 
to generate and validate the values. 
 
We have discussed the trusted boot process of using a TPM 
for establishing a root of trust during system bring up. We 
now move into a concept called Trusted Execution 
Environment.  The ARM TrustedZone provides the memory 
management to be partitioned and restricted for secure 
applications. ARM has been working toward Security Services 
for DDS security plugins using ARM TrustedZone [5] [27]. 
Figure 10 shows a flow from normal to secure world where 
the securitylib (new name libddssec) communicates to the 
security libraries running in restricted memory space. Figure 
10 shows the architecture Cortex -A (applications 32/64-bit 
architecture) and for Cortex -M (embedded 32-bit 
architecture) the TEE layer might be removed with direct 
firmware communications.  The exception levels, EL0 -user 
space application, EL1 -privileged OS, EL2 – Hypervisor, and 
EL3 – firmware/security monitor. Cortex-A supports 
TrustZone with Memory Management Unit and the Cortex-M 
supports TrustZone with Memory Protection Units (MPU).  
Physical memory is divided into Normal or Secure by setting 
NS bit within the Translation Lookahead Buffer (TLB) for all 
system memory on an A architecture, where the MPU is 
programmed for different regions. Physical memory size on an 
M architecture is 4GBytes, where on the A architecture it can 
grow by adding RAM. Secure world has access to Normal, but 
not the reverse. A context switch is performed from normal 
world to secure by a calling an API. The M35P is an 
interesting chip with claim for anti-tamping protection against 
side channel attacks. 
 
While the trusted execution environments vendors make 
claims that they are secure, and researchers continuously 
scrutinizing TEEs have discovered several vulnerabilities. 
There is a position paper that points out limited functionality 
within the secure region for, no mechanism to verify execution 
code, no defense within the secure region, no detection 
mechanism, and no mitigation when comprised [28].  Other 
work has been focused on side channels, power management 
and cache timing attacks on ARM processors with Trustzone 
[29] [30] [31].  Intel has its version called Software Guard 
Extensions (SGX), but this has been comprised leveraging the 
speculative execution bug [32].  Also, from a performance 
point of view, it was covered in this paper [3] that enabling 
security added latency, throughput and speed overhead to each 
of the transactions. By performing context switches between 
normal and secure world, this will surely add additional 
performance penalties for saving the state data to registers, 
startup, teardown and data validation process between the 
worlds., this is a consideration for real-time constraints. Since 
the secuirutylib work that ARM is working on is to enable the 
security plugins to live in the secure world, this would help 
mitigate against the OpenSSL dump routine during execution 
time but does not cover the data at rest or off-line attacks, for 
example a cold boot attack [33]. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 10: Security Services for DDS security plugins using ARM 
TrustZone 
Our recommendation on Linux is to use IMA/EVM, since this 
technology has been up streamed and supported in the kernel 
[34]. IMA maintains a run time integrity list and is anchored 
to PCR 10 in the TPM. By extending the PCR 10 for each file 
listed in the policy, each measurement is aggregated into a 
value. This makes an attack difficult, since all the sequences 
and values must be known to re construct the result. Features 
of IMA include [35]: 
Collect – measure a file before it is accessed. 
Store – add the measurement to a kernel resident list and, 
if a hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is present, 
extend the IMA PCR 
Attest – if present, use the TPM to sign the IMA PCR 
value, to allow a remote validation of the measurement 
list. 
Appraise – enforce local validation of a measurement 
against a “good” value stored in an extended attribute of 
the file. 
Protect – protect a file's security extended attributes 
(including appraisal hash) against off-line attack. 
Audit – audit the file hashes. 
 
Table 3 shows a full software stack that includes the platform 
trusted services used to request quotes from the compute node, 
trusted software stack used as the interface for TPMs, 
IMA/EVM and the rest of the trusted boot as mentioned above 
[35].  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Full stack of PTS, TSS, TPM and boot process using TCG 
specifications 
Software Layer Specification Interface 
Application PTS OpenPTS, TPM-
Tools 
Libraries TSS TrouSerS 
Linux Kernel TPM-2 IMA, EVM, TPM 
Driver 
Boot BIOS GRUB-IMA, 
TBOOT 
Hardware TPM Software TPM 
 
By using the features of IMA, store and protect, the two 
templates below provide an example for each. Store provides a 
hash for the file to be generated, while protect adds a 
signature. An example of using an ima-ng template [35]: 
 
PCR     template-hash                     filedata-hash                           filename-hint 
10 91f34b5c671d73504b274a919661cf80dab1e127 ima-ng 
sha1:1801e1be3e65ef1eaa5c16617bec8f1274eaf6b3 boot_aggregate  
 
Another example using an ima-sig template [35]: 
 
PCR     template-hash      filedata-hash       filename-hint         file-signature 
10 f63c10947347c71ff205ebfde5971009af27b0ba ima-sig 
sha256:6c118980083bccd259f069c2b3c3f3a2f5302d17a685409786564f4cf05
b3939 /usr/lib64/libgspell-1.so.1.0.0   
0302046e6c10460100aa43a4b1136f45735669632ad ... 
 
Additional information can be found in the kernel.org [36] 
about the IMA template management module. The protection 
provided by trusted boot and the IMA/EVM, this mechanism 
protects against offline attacks as well. Since IMA is a run 
time process files are being checked constantly, for changes. 
Having both OpenSSL and the property file under this type of 
control will mitigate several attacks, like the ones we 
demonstrated above. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
We have presented two attack vectors related to ROS2/DDS 
security and have identified four different use case scenarios 
that are plausible. In each use case the adversary was able to 
obtain control of data or direct manipulation of the platform 
using the modified OpenSSL library and/or the configuration 
file with credential masquerading.  In the first and second use 
cases, the data was either decrypted by possessing the correct 
keys or directly reading the plaintext data from the dump 
routines. In the third and fourth use cases either having the 
possession of the keys and/or credential masquerading could 
have achieved success by the adversary. 
 
This paper presented the two attack vectors and compared 
technologies to help mitigate the risks. Even when files have 
been downloaded and checked with a hash, that one-time 
check does not provide the safeguards against ongoing threats. 
We believe that IMA/EVM can help mitigate against these 
  
threats, since it’s a runtime and offline security set of features 
to protect files. The trusted boot does provide checks on the 
lower levels of the software stack to enable the OS to boot 
with a root of trust mechanism. While the Securitylib running 
in ARM Trustzone is an interesting protection mechanism, it 
only accounts for two of the five DDS security plugins. The 
need for a holistic security solution still needs to be considered 
for robotic architectures, since the new movement is toward 
autonomous. Enabling a TPM within a robotic platform and 
how attestation will be performed are new concepts that need 
to be extended beyond the traditional mechanism of trusted 
boot. 
 
Future work, we believe that research is still at the early stages 
with consideration to using TPMs in robotic systems and how 
it’s managed, validation of attestation performed by who and 
what remediation behavior will be put in place. New policies 
related to not just ethics, but security should be considered for 
robotic platforms. These are not IoT devices like some 
industry vendors are claiming and that a one solution can’t be 
for all. Robots are moving into a cognitive learning phase 
where limited data is needed to learn and evolve within their 
environments. This is quite different from an IoT device. 
. 
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